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Abstract: Though individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there
are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group if higher ranked
members of a group have greater access to the group's resources. When two organizations
try to attract members from a ¯xed population of heterogeneous agents, how resources
are distributed among the members according to their rank a®ects how agents choose
between the organizations. Competition between the two organizations has implications
for both the equilibrium sorting of agents and the way resources are distributed within each
organization. To compete more intensely for the more talented agents, both organizations
are selective and give no resources to their low ranks. In both organizations, higher ranks
are rewarded with more resources, with a greater rate of increase in the organization that
has a lower average quality in equilibrium.
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{ i {1. Introduction
Distributions of talents across organizations exhibit patterns of both mixing and segrega-
tion. At the risk of being accused of self-indulgence, let us look at the example of distri-
bution of economists by productivities across departments. Highly productive researchers
can be found in many second-tier departments as well as in top-ranked institutions. How-
ever, there is an unmistakable hierarchy of departments in terms of average productivity
of their faculty members.
A plausible explanation for the coexistence of mixing and segregation is sorting by
talents who care both about the quality of the institution they join and about their rel-
ative ranking within the institution. In Damiano, Li and Suen (2005), we call these two
concerns \peer e®ect" and \pecking order e®ect." The peer e®ect is widely acknowledged
in the education literature (e.g., Coleman et al., 1966; Summers and Wolfe, 1977; Lazear,
2001; Sacerdote 2001), and modeled extensively in the literature on locational choice (De
Bartolome, 1990; Epple and Romano, 1998). The pecking order e®ect can be motivated by
concerns for self-esteem (Frank, 1985), competition for mates in the same location (Cole,
Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992), or competition for resources among members of an orga-
nization (Postlewaite, 1998). These two e®ects highlight competition and cooperation as
two important features of the interaction among talents within an organization.
This paper studies organizational strategies to attract talents in the presence of these
concerns, and analyzes the resulting equilibrium pattern of sorting. Consider an academic
department trying to improve its standing by hiring a new faculty member. Several eco-
nomic forces in°uence such a decision. First, if the potential appointee is of high quality,
the presence of such a colleague in the department will make the department more attrac-
tive to other faculty members and may therefore help the department's other recruiting
e®orts. Second, the new recruit can upset the department's existing hierarchical struc-
ture and bring about implications for the internal distribution of departmental resources.
\Salary inversion" is often seen as a potential problem in academia (Lamb and Moates,
1999; Siegfried and Stock, 2004). More generally, conventional wisdom in personnel man-
agement emphasizes the importance of \internal relativity" in the reward structure of any
{ 1 {organization. In other words, the decision to make a job o®er cannot be viewed in isolation;
instead the entire reward structure of the organization has to be taken into account. Third,
in a thin labor market with relatively few employers, the recruitment e®orts of one depart-
ment will a®ect the availability of the labor pool for another department. Hiring decisions
therefore have general equilibrium repercussions that needs to be taken into account.
Our paper develops a model of the competition for talents which incorporates all these
economic forces.1 In our model, talents care about their relative ranking within the orga-
nization they join because higher ranks receive more resources, and they care about the
overall quality of the organization. Organizations compete for talents by designing how
resources are allocated according to rank. We characterize a unique equilibrium of orga-
nizational competition which determines the entire reward structure of each organization,
as well as the equilibrium pattern of sorting. In equilibrium the targets of competition are
the top talents; only these agents receive positive shares of resources from either organi-
zation. Furthermore, equilibrium reward structures are systematically di®erent between
the high quality organization and the low quality organization. The organization that in
equilibrium attracts a higher average quality of talents has a more egalitarian distribution
of resources than the low quality organization, because the low quality organization is
disadvantaged by the peer e®ect and must concentrate its resources on a smaller set of top
talents. The equilibrium sorting of talents exhibits mixing of top talents, with a greater
share of them going to the high quality organization, while segregation occurs for all types
that receive no resources in equilibrium, with the better types going to the high quality
organization.
In section 2, we formally introduce our model of organizational competition. The
model is broadly based on Damiano, Li and Suen (2005). Talents have one-dimensional
types distributed uniformly, and a utility function linear in the average type of the organi-
zation they join and the resource they receive in the organization. Each organization faces
a ¯xed capacity constraint that allows it to accept half of an exogenously given talent pool,
1 The existing economic literature on the competition for talents typically focuses on either the infor-
mational spillovers resulting from o®ers and counter-o®ers (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993; Lazear, 1996),
or the implications of raiding for ¯rms' incentive to o®er training (Moen and Rosen, 2004). Tranaes (2001)
studies the impact of raiding opportunities on unemployment in a search environment.
{ 2 {and a ¯xed total budget of resources that can be allocated among its ranks. We use the no-
tion of sorting equilibrium de¯ned in Damiano, Li and Suen (2005) to describe how talents
sort after the organizations have chosen their resource distribution schedules. The issue of
multiple equilibria is resolved by labeling the organization with a greater resource budget
(or either of the two organizations when they have the same budget) as the \dominant"
one, and selecting the sorting equilibrium with the largest di®erence in average types in
its favor. This quality di®erence then de¯nes the payo®s of the two organizations in the
game in which they simultaneously choose their resource distribution schedules.
The game of organizational competition is strictly competitive. In section 3, we show
that the game has a minmax value corresponding to the largest quality di®erence that
the dominant organization can obtain in a Nash equilibrium of the game. The technical
di±culty in this step lies in the fact that we do not have a characterization of the selected
sorting equilibrium in terms of an arbitrary pair of resource distribution schedules, so we
cannot use the standard approach of constructing best response correspondences. Instead,
under the assumption that the type distribution is uniform, we transform the minmax
problem into one in which the weaker organization maximizes the minimum resource bud-
get required to achieve a given target of quality di®erence. We then use the result to
characterize the minmax value and identify a unique resource distribution schedule for the
weaker organization to achieve the value. There is a critical rank that receives strictly
positive resource, with all ranks below receiving no resources and the resources received
by the ranks above increasing linearly in rank. Intuitively, the weaker organization has
to pay a peer e®ect premium in order to compete with the dominant organization, which
leads to the jump in the resource distribution schedule at the critical rank. Further, a
linear resource allocation schedule is necessary in order to avoid having its high ranks
cherry-picked by the rival organization.
In section 4 we characterize a unique Nash equilibrium of the organizational com-
petition. The existence of the equilibrium is established by construction. In equilibrium
the dominant organization chooses a resource distribution schedule similar to the minmax
schedule of the weaker organization. There is a critical rank below which ranks receive
no resources in the dominant organization, because they attract no competition from the
{ 3 {weaker organization. Ranks above the critical rank in the dominant organization receive
resources that increase linearly in rank, with no discontinuity at the critical rank and a
smaller rate of increase than that in weaker organization. Sorting of talents in this equi-
librium involves mixing of top talents between the two organizations, and segregation for
low types. We also show that the equilibrium is a unique one, by establishing that for any
other resource distribution schedule of the dominant organization, the weaker organization
can improve upon the minmax schedule.
Section 5 provides some comparative statics results regarding the unique Nash equilib-
rium of the game of competing for talents. When the organizations have a greater budget
for resource distribution, or when the peer e®ect becomes less important in the talents'
utility function, the equilibrium exhibits a smaller disparity between the dominant and the
weaker organizations. We then conclude the paper in section 6 with brief discussions of
some of the main assumptions of the model.
2. The Model
Two organizations, A and B, compete for a measure 2 of agents. Agents di®er with
respect to a one-dimensional continuously distributed characteristic, called \type" and
denoted by µ. We assume that the distribution of µ is uniform on the interval [0;1]. Each
organization i = A;B has a measure 1 of positions and a ¯xed resource budget Yi to be
allocated among its members. Without loss of generality, we assume that YA ¸ YB. An
organization determines the distribution of its resource budget Yi by choosing a \resource
distribution schedule." A resource distribution schedule for organization i is a function
Si : [0;1] ! IR+; which stipulates how Yi is allocated among i's members according to
their rank. For each r 2 [0;1], let Si(r) denote the amount of resources received by an
agent of type µ when a fraction r of the organization's members are of type smaller than
µ. We make the assumption that organizations can only adopt \meritocratic" resource
distribution schedules in which members of higher ranks receive at least as much resources
as lower ranks. We also make the technical assumption that only resource distribution
schedules which are almost everywhere continuously di®erentiable are admissible. Each
{ 4 {organization must ¯ll all its positions and each wants to maximize its own quality, measured
by the average type of its members.
Preferences of agents over the two organizations depend on the comparison of the
qualities of the two organizations and of the amount of resources they receive when joining.
For each i = A;B, let mi be the average type of agents in organization i. Let ri(µ) be
the quantile rank of an agent of type µ in organization i. If Si is the resource distribution
schedule in organization i, then the utility to an agent µ from joining organization i is
given by
Vi(µ) = ®Si(ri(µ)) + mi (2:1)
where ® is a positive constant that represents the weight on the concern for the pecking
order e®ect relative to the concern for the peer e®ect.2 The payo® is zero if an agent does
not join either organization.
2.1. Sorting equilibrium
Since each agent's outside option is zero and each organization must ¯ll all positions, a
feasible allocation of the agents among the two organizations can be described by a pair
of the type distribution functions in the two organizations, as follows.
Definition 2.1. A feasible allocation is a pair of cumulative distribution functions
(HA;HB) such that HA(µ) + HB(µ) = 2µ for all µ 2 [0;1].
Given a pair of resource distribution schedules (SA;SB), the agents sort themselves
between the two organizations. We call this the sorting stage. We adapt the notion of
\priority equilibrium" in Damiano, Li and Suen (2005) to the present environment.
Definition 2.2. Given a pair of resource distribution schedules (SA;SB), a sorting equi-
librium is a feasible allocation (HA;HB) such that if Hi is strictly increasing on (µ;µ0) and
Hj(µ) > 0; then Vi(µ) ¸ Vj(µ):
2 In our model agents do not directly care about their relative ranking in the organization. The
concern for the pecking order e®ect is generated endogenously because the organizations choose how to
distribute resources according to ranks.
{ 5 {The notion of sorting equilibrium above suggests that an agent will join organization i
whenever he prefers organization i and his type is higher than the lowest type of the other
organization.3
Existence of a sorting equilibrium can be established by a ¯xed point argument. Before
doing so, it is convenient to introduce an alternative representation of feasible allocations
through allocation functions.4
Definition 2.3. Given a feasible allocation (HA;HB), the associated allocation function
is t : [0;1] ! [0;1], de¯ned by
t(r) ´ 1 ¡ HA (inffµ : HB(µ) = rg): (2:2)
In the de¯nition above, the variable t(r) is the fraction of agents in organization A of
type higher than rank r's type in organization B. For example, if the distribution of talents
is perfectly segregated with the higher types exclusively in organization A, then t(r) = 1
for all r; and if there is perfect mixing so that the distribution of types is identical across
the two organizations, then t(r) = 1¡r. Using the de¯nition of allocation function above,
we associate to each feasible allocation an (essentially) unique non-increasing function on
the unit intervals. See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the allocation function. The
infemum operator in the de¯nition (2.2) is applied to handle the case where HB is °at over
some interval (i.e. when there is local segregation with all types in the interval going to
organization A).
Conversely, each non-increasing function t : [0;1] ! [0;1] identi¯es an (essentially)





0 if 2µ · 1 ¡ t(0);
1 if 2µ ¸ 2 ¡ t(1);
supfr : 2µ ¸ r + 1 ¡ t(r)g otherwise;
3 See our earlier paper for a more detailed discussion of priority equilibrium.
4 The de¯nition below does not rely on the assumption that µ is distributed uniformly on [0;1]. We can
represent a feasible allocation by an allocation function under any continuous type distribution. However,
such representation is not directly useful because the quality di®erence cannot be written as an integral of
the allocation function.







and where HA(µ) = 2µ ¡ HB(µ). Thus, there is a one-to-one mapping from feasible
allocations to non-increasing function on the unit interval. The convenience of working
with allocation functions is made explicit by the following lemma, where we show that, for
any feasible allocation, the quality di®erence between the two organizations only depends
on the integral of the associated allocation function.5
Lemma 2.4. Let (HA;HB) be a feasible allocation and t the associated allocation function.
Then






















where µB = supfµ : HB(µ) = 0g and µB = inffµ : HB(µ) = 1g. From the feasibility







5 Without the assumption of uniform type distribution, we can still use equation (2.2) to relate the
quality di®erence to the exogenous distribution function of types and the endogenous allocation function.
However, the result will not be a weighted average of t(r).
{ 7 {r 1   tT(r) 1   t
T(r)
SA + P(T) SB
Figure 2
The claim then follows immediately from the fact that mA + mB = 1. Q.E.D.
Since for any allocation, the quality di®erence between the two organizations is the





as the di®erence in quality. The constant (T ¡ 1=2)=® represents the quality premium of
A over B, in that any agent would be just indi®erent between the two if the agent receives
from B a resource greater than what he receives from A by that premium. We denote the





For any di®erence in quality T 2 [0;1], let tT and t




1 if SA(0) + P(T) > SB(r);





0 if SA(1) + P(T) < SB(r);
1 ¡ inff~ r 2 [0;1] : SA(~ r) + P(T) ¸ SB(r)g otherwise.
In words, the agent who has rank r in B must have rank at most 1 ¡ tT(r) in A or he
would prefer to switch; he must also have rank at least 1 ¡ t
T(r) in A or otherwise some
agent from A would want to switch. See Figure 2.
{ 8 {The following proposition identi¯es necessary and su±cient conditions for an alloca-
tion function to constitute a sorting equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5. A feasible allocation (HA;HB) is a sorting equilibrium if and only if
the associated allocation function t satisfy tT(r) · tT(r) · t




Proof. Follows immediately from the de¯nition of sorting equilibrium. Q.E.D.











The above proposition implies that any sorting equilibrium is a ¯xed point T 2 [0;1] of D.
Existence of a sorting equilibrium then follows from an application of Tarski's ¯xed point
theorem.
Multiple sorting equilibria exist in general. To study the game in which the two
organizations compete by choosing resource distribution schedules we must introduce an
equilibrium selection in the sorting stage. We assume that organization A is dominant in
that the sorting equilibrium with the largest di®erence in quality T is played in the sorting
stage. This \A-dominant equilibrium" is unique. The equilibrium quality di®erence, T =






and the equilibrium allocation function is given by tT. We note that ¯xed points of D
which are non-extremal may be unstable in the sense that small perturbations in the
quality di®erence T can cause agents to switch organizations in such a way that moves T
further away from the initial ¯xed point. On the other hand, the A-dominant equilibrium
is always stable (Damiano, Li and Suen, 2005).
Now we can de¯ne a \resource distribution game" in which the two organizations
simultaneously choose their resource distribution schedules to maximize their own quality.
For any (SA;SB), the payo® to organization i is de¯ned as the average type of i's members
{ 9 {in the A-dominant sorting equilibrium. Since the sum of the payo®s to the two organiza-
tion is constant, the resource distribution game is strictly competitive, with A trying to
maximize the di®erence in quality, TA(SA;SB), and B trying to minimize it. Therefore,
a strategy pro¯le (S¤
A;S¤
B) is a Nash equilibrium of the resource distribution game if and
only if6
S¤




















where the strategy space Si (i = A;B) is the set of all non-negative, non-decreasing
and almost everywhere continuously di®erentiable functions which respect the resource
constraint
R 1
0 Si(r) dr · Yi.
3. The Minmax Value
In this section we characterize the minmax value minSB maxSA TA(SA;SB). This corre-
sponds to the maximum quality di®erence that organization A can hope to achieve in
any Nash equilibrium of the resource distribution game. We also characterize the unique
resource distribution schedule S¤
B that achieves the minmax value.
Before we proceed with the analysis it is useful to sketch a road map. For any resource
distribution schedule SB and any di®erence in quality T, we characterize the lowest resource
expenditure C(T;SB) needed for A to attain a sorting equilibrium with quality di®erence
T. Note that we are not requiring T to be the A-dominant equilibrium quality di®erence at
this point. Next, we characterize the maximum value of this minimum resource expenditure
C(T;SB) that B can impose on A by choosing resource distribution schedule SB subject
to the resource budget constraint YB. This gives us the maximum resource budget E(T) =
maxSB C(T;SB). The largest T¤ such that E(T¤) is equal to YA is then a lower bound for
6 Since the resource distribution game is not ¯nite, we cannot assume that maxminimizers and min-
maximizers exist. These are shown to exist by construction.
{ 10 {the minmax value. We show that C(T;S¤
B) is larger than YA for all T > T ¤, implying that
T¤ is also an upper bound on the minmax value and therefore the minmax value. Finally,
our argument also establishes a unique resource distribution schedule S¤
B that achieves the
minmax value.
For YA ¸ YB, the A-dominant selection implies that the minmax value is at least
1=2.7 This is because, for any resource distribution schedule SB, when SA = SB, there
is a sorting equilibrium where the distributions of types in the two organizations are the
same. Thus we restrict our analysis below to T ¸ 1=2.
3.1. The expenditure minimization problem
In this subsection, we describe the potential strategies that organization A can adopt
to attract talent from the weaker organization. Note that such strategies need not be
observed in equilibrium, because organization B will adopt counter-measures that render
A's potential strategies ine®ective. Nevertheless, understanding these potential strategies
of A is essential to solving the minmax problem for B. For given SB and some T ¸ 1=2,
we want to ¯nd the cheapest SA such that T is a sorting equilibrium for (SA;SB): If SA is
such resource distribution schedule we denote with C(T;SB) the integral of SA. Instead
of characterizing C(T;SB) through resource distribution schedules SA, we will work with
allocation functions t.
First, note that by de¯nition of tT, we have tT(r) = 1 for all r such that SB(r) <
P(T). Thus, if SB(~ r) < P(T) for some ~ r > T, then there is no equilibrium with quality
di®erence T regardless of the resource distribution schedule SA. Moreover, even if A gives
no resources to all of its ranks (i.e., SA(r) = 0 for all r), there is a sorting equilibrium with
quality di®erence strictly larger than T. In this case, we write C(T;SB) = 0.
Next, suppose SB(T) ¸ P(T). Then, for any allocation function t, with
R 1
0 t(r) dr = T
and t(r) = 1 for any r such that SB(r) < P(T), let St
A be the pointwise smallest resource
distribution schedule that satis¯es
St
A(1 ¡ t(r)) ¸ maxfSB(r) ¡ P(T);0g for all r 2 [0;1]:
7 If YA < YB, it is more natural to focus on the B-dominant equilibrium, which corresponds to the









See Figure 3. By construction, given the schedules (St
A;SB), t
T is pointwise larger than t
while tT is pointwise smaller than t. It follows that T is a ¯xed point of the mapping (2.3)
and hence there exists a sorting equilibrium with quality di®erence T for (St
A;SB).
The schedule St
A is the resource distribution schedule with the lowest expenditure for










t(r) dr = T;
t(r) = 1 if SB(r) ¡ P(T) < 0:
(3:1)













t¡1(1 ¡ r) = supf~ r 2 [0;1] : 1 ¡ t(~ r) · rg:












t(~ r)¢0(~ r) d~ r ¡ ¢(t¡1(1));
where for notational convenience we have de¯ned
¢(~ r) = maxfSB(~ r) ¡ P(T);0g
{ 12 {as the e®ective resource distribution schedule of the weaker organization B. We can then












where we have dropped the second constraint of (3.1) since it will be satis¯ed by any
solution to (3.2). Note that both the objective function and the constraint are linear in
the control variable t. This feature is used below to characterize the solution, and it is
why we have chosen to deal with the allocation function instead of with type distribution
functions directly.
Problem (3.2) is the continuous analog of a linear programming problem. The next
lemma establishes that there exists a solution to (3.2) which assumes at most one value
strictly between 0 and 1. This result is then used to provide an explicit characterization
of the solution and a value for C(T;SB).
Lemma 3.1. For any allocation function t with
R 1
0 t(r) dr = T, there exists an allocation
function ~ t with
R 1









t(r)¢0(r) dr ¡ ¢(t¡1(1)):
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
The above results imply that we can restrict the search for a solution to (3.2) to
allocation functions that assume at most one value strictly between 0 and 1. First, an
allocation function t that has just one positive value is entirely characterized by its only
discontinuity point, say ^ r. To see this, note that since all solutions to (3.2) satisfy the
constraint
R 1
0 t(r) dr = T, if t is zero for r > ^ r and constant for r < ^ r, then we have
t(r) = T=^ r for all r · ^ r to satisfy the constraint. Also note that ^ r ¸ T must hold in
this case. Second, an allocation function t that has one value strictly between 0 and 1
is entirely characterized by its two discontinuity points. Letting r1 = supfr : t(r) = 1g
{ 13 {and r0 = supfr : t(r) > 0g, and using the constraint
R 1
0 t(r) dr = T, we have t(r) =
(T ¡ r1)=(r0 ¡ r1) for r 2 (r1;r0). Note that r1 · T and r0 ¸ T in this case.

















Using the above characterization for C(T;SB) it is possible to obtain a characteriza-
tion of a solution to problem (3.2) as a function of ¢. To do so, given a function ¢, we
let ^ ¢ denote the largest convex function which is pointwise smaller than ¢ and such that
^ ¢(0) = 0. Formally, ^ ¢ is obtained as the lower contour of the convex hull of the function
¢ and the origin. That is,
^ ¢(r) = minfy : (r;y) 2 co(f(~ r; ~ y) : 0 · ~ r · 1; ~ y ¸ ¢(~ x)g [ (0;0))g:
The next lemma provides a simple characterization of the discontinuity points of a solution
to (3.2) which depends only on the functions ¢ and ^ ¢. In particular, it states that if
¢(T) = ^ ¢(T); then there is a solution to (3.2) with only one discontinuity point at exactly
T. The optimal allocation function t is step function equal to 1 for r · T and equal to 0 for
r > T. When ¢(T) > ^ ¢(T) instead, there is an optimal allocation with two discontinuity
points r1 < T and r0 > T. The two discontinuity points are determined by the largest
r < T and the smallest r > T at which the function ¢ coincides with its convex hull. The
optimal allocation function t equals 1 up to r1 and becomes 0 at r0:




1 if r · T;
0 otherwise.
solves (3.2). (ii) Otherwise, for r1 = supfr 2 Q : r < Tg and r0 = inffr 2 Q : r > Tg, a





1 if r < r1;
(T ¡ r1)=(r0 ¡ r1) if r1 · r · r0;
0 if r > r0:
In both cases, the value of the objective function is C(T;SB) = ¢(T).




























































At the claimed solution, if T 2 Q, then the value of the objective function is ¢(T) = ^ ¢(T).
If T 62 Q; then the value of the objective function is given by
r0 ¡ T
r0 ¡ r1¢(r1) +
T ¡ r1






^ ¢(r0) = ^ ¢(T);
where the second equality holds because ^ ¢ is linear between r1 and r0. Moreover, for all










r0 ¡ r1¢(r1) +
T ¡ r1
r0 ¡ r1¢(r0);
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the fact that ^ ¢ is convex and the second from














Thus t is a solution to (3.2). Q.E.D.
{ 15 {Figure 4 illustrates the second case of the above lemma. The total quality di®erence
to be achieved for organization A is T. The optimal discontinuity points r0 and r1 are
identi¯ed in the diagram. For any other pair of discontinuity points ^ r0 and ^ r1, the resulting
resource expenditure for A is greater. The two cases in Lemma 3.2 depend on whether T
can be achieved by targeting a single rank ^ r of B and giving to su±ciently many ranks
in A the minimum resource to be competitive with ^ r, or by targeting two ranks r1 and
r0 and giving all ranks in A enough resources to compete with r1 and giving su±ciently
many ranks in A additional resources to compete with r0.8 Minimizing the expenditure
for A is then equivalent to choosing the cheapest ranks in B to raid.
3.2. The budget function
For each T ¸ 1=2, we next try to characterize the resource distribution schedule SB that
makes the budget of generating an allocation with di®erence in quality T as large as







SB(r) dr · YB:
(3:4)
Our characterization of the strategy for expenditure minimization for A in Lemma
3.2 suggests that organization B would be wasting its resources if it chooses a schedule
SB such that ¢(r) > ^ ¢(r) for some r. Thus a solution to (3.4) must satisfy the condition
that ¢(r) = ^ ¢(r). Furthermore, if organization A decides to raid some rank, say ^ r, by
choosing t(r) = 1 for r < ^ r, there is no point for B to give any resources to ranks below
^ r. On the other hand, B must pay at least P(T) to ranks above ^ r if it is to compete
with organization A. This means that for T > 1=2, the solution to (3.4) will involve a
point of discontinuity. Our next result establishes that there is a solution SB to (3.4)
with the property that it is 0 up to some critical rank r(T), equal to P(T) at r(T), and
8 In the ¯rst case, the corresponding resource distribution schedule St
A is °at and is such that the
lowest type in A is just indi®erent between staying in A at rank 0 and switching to B for rank ^ r. In the
second case, St
A is a step function with two levels, such that the lowest type in A is just indi®erent between
staying and switching to B for rank r1, and the lowest type receiving the higher level of resources in A is
just indi®erent between staying and switching for rank r0.
{ 16 {has a constant slope between r(T) and 1. Since this solution is entirely characterized by
r(T) and the resource constraint that
R 1
0 SB(r) dr = YB, this characterization result will
then be used to solve explicitly for the critical threshold r(T), and to obtain an analytical
expression for the \budget function" E(T).
Lemma 3.3. For any SB 2 SB, there is ~ SB 2 SB such that, for some ~ r 2 [0;1],
~ SB(r) =
(
0 if r < ~ r,
P(T) + ¯(r ¡ ~ r) if r ¸ ~ r;
(3:5)
where ¯ is determined by
R 1
0
~ SB(r) dr = YB, with the property that C(T; ~ SB) ¸ C(T;SB).
Proof. Let ¢SB(r) denote maxfSB(r) ¡ P(T);0g. First, since C(T;SB) only depends
on ¢SB, it cannot be decreased if we replace SB with some ~ SB such that ~ SB(r) = 0
whenever ~ SB(r) < P(T). Second, by Lemma 3.2, C(T;SB) = ^ ¢SB(T) for any resource
distribution schedule SB. This implies that C(T;SB) = C(T; ~ SB) if ~ SB is such that
¢~ SB = ^ ¢SB. Thus for any SB, there is a resource distribution schedule ~ SB which is
convex whenever positive and ¢ ~ SB(0) = 0 such that C(T; ~ SB) ¸ C(T;SB). Finally, for
any SB that is convex whenever positive and ¢SB(0) = 0, there is an ~ SB which is linear
when positive such that C(T; ~ SB) ¸ C(T;SB). The lemma then immediately follows from
the resource constraint because binding the constraint increases the budget requirement
for the dominant organization A. Q.E.D.
By Lemma 3.3, we can restrict to resource distribution schedules of the form (3.5)
when characterizing a solution to (3.4). In other words, solving (3.4) boils down to ¯nding
the point of discontinuity r(T) of the SB schedule. When SB has a discontinuity at r, the
resource constraint for B requires that ¯ = 2(YB ¡P(T)(1¡r))=(1¡r)2. Using the form
of SB described in equation (3.5), we have C(T;SB) = ¢SB(T) = ¯(T ¡ r). Thus, the




(1 ¡ r)2 (YB ¡ P(T)(1 ¡ r)): (3:6)
The maximization problem (3.6) can be solved analytically. In particular, it is straight-
forward to show that the optimal point of discontinuity r(T) is given by
r(T) =
(





{ 17 {We note that r(T) is increasing in T, with r(1=2) = 0 and limT!1 r(T) = 1. In other
words, the optimal way to deter the dominant organization from getting a higher average
quality is for the weaker organization to concentrate more of its resources to reward its
higher-rank members.
Substituting r(T) from equation (3.7) into the cost function in (3.6), we obtain an
explicit form for the budget function:
E(T) =
(





The following lemma describes the properties of this budget function.
Lemma 3.4. The budget function E(T) satis¯es E(1=2) = YB, and limT!1 E(T) = 1.
Moreover, (i) If ®YB > 1=2; then E0(T) > 0 for all T ¸ 1=2; (ii) if ®YB 2 [1=16;1=2],
then there exists a ^ T such that E0(T) < 0 for T 2 (1=2; ^ T) and E0(T) > 0 for T 2 (^ T;1);
(iii) if ®YB < 1=16, then there exist T¡ and T+ such that E0(T) < 0 for T 2 (1=2;T¡);
E0(T) > 0 for T 2 (T+;1) and E(T) = 0 for T 2 [T¡;T+].
Proof. The ¯rst two properties in the statement of the lemma follows directly from
substituting T = 1=2 and T = 1 into the budget function (3.8). Next, when E(T) > 0, its
derivative has is positive if and only if
®YB + (1 ¡ T)(3T ¡ 5=2) > 0:
The above holds for all T ¸ 1=2 if ®YB > 1=2, thus establishing (i). When ®YB · 1=2,
there exists a unique ^ T 2 [1=2;1] such that the above inequality holds for T > ^ T while the
opposite inequality holds for T < ^ T. From the characterization of the budget function (3.8)
we have that E(T) = 0 when YB · P(T)(1¡T). The quadratic equation YB = P(T)(1¡T)
has two real roots T¡ and T+ in [1=2;1] when ®Y · 1=16, and no real root otherwise.
Claims (ii) and (iii) follow. Q.E.D.
See Figure 5 for the three di®erence cases of E(T). An increase in the target quality
di®erence T has two opposite e®ects on the budget E(T) required for A. On one hand,




1=2 < YB 1=16  YB  1=2
YB < 1=16
Figure 5
requires a larger budget. On the other hand, a greater T also increases the quality premium
that A enjoys over B and this reduces the budget requirement. The ¯rst e®ect dominates
when the peer e®ect is relatively small, which happens when either ® or YB is large.
This explains why E(T) is monotonically increasing in T when ®Y is large. In contrast,
the peer e®ect is strong and E(T) may decrease when ®YB is small. Indeed, the budget
requirement for some intermediate values of T can be zero. Note that for su±ciently large
T, the budget function must be increasing. This is because by concentrating its resources
on a few top ranks organization B can make it increasingly costly for A to achieve large
quality di®erences.
3.3. The minmax value and the minmax strategy
From the budget function E(T) we can derive a lower bound on the minmax value. In
particular, de¯ne
T¤ = maxfT 2 [1=2;1] : E(T) = YAg: (3:9)
Note that for YA ¸ YB, the existence of T¤ follows from the characterization of the budget
function in Lemma 3.4. Moreover, T¤ = 1=2 if and only if YA = YB ¸ 1=2. For all other
values of YA and YB such that YA ¸ YB, we have T¤ > 1=2.






{ 19 {This is because C(T¤;SB) · E(T¤) = YA for any SB, and hence there is a resource distribu-




and denote as S¤









(1¡r¤)2 (r ¡ r¤) if r ¸ r¤.
(3:10)
The next proposition establishes that the minmax value coincides with the lower bound
T¤ by verifying that C(T;S¤
B) > YA for all T > T ¤, so that T¤ is also an upper bound of
the minmax problem.
Proposition 3.5. The resource distribution schedule S¤
B given by (3.10) is the unique
solution to the minmax problem minSB2SB maxSA2SA TA(SA;SB).
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
When organization B chooses resource distribution schedule S¤
B, in order to achieve
the quality di®erence T¤ organization A must expend all its available resources. However,
this may fail to guarantee that a larger quality di®erence is infeasible for A, because
a larger T increases the quality premium and frees some resources for A. The above
proposition establishes that given S¤
B, this peer e®ect is small relative to the additional
resource requirement for obtaining a greater quality di®erence than T¤.
4. The Nash Equilibrium
The analysis of the previous section has identi¯ed T¤ as the minmax value of the resource
distribution game and the resource distribution schedule S¤
B de¯ned in equation (3.10) as
9 This is the ¯rst time in deriving the minmax value that we use the selection criterion of focusing on
the A-dominant equilibrium. The proposition below also uses the selection criterion by establishing that
there is no sorting equilibrium with quality di®erence greater than T¤ against S¤
B de¯ned below.
{ 20 {the only candidate Nash equilibrium strategy for B. Thus, whether a Nash equilibrium
exists only depends on whether maxSA minSB TA(SA;SB) = T¤. Moreover, if the set of
Nash equilibria is non-empty, there is a distinct Nash equilibrium for each distinct solution
to the maxmin problem. A direct characterization of the set of solutions to the maxmin
problem and the maxmin value is di±cult. Instead we proceed by ¯rst proving that
equilibrium strategies must satisfy some additional properties. By using these properties
and the fact that the equilibrium strategy of B is given by S¤
B, we identify a candidate
equilibrium strategy S¤
A for A. We then establish that a Nash equilibrium exists by directly
verifying that (S¤
A;S¤
B) is indeed a Nash equilibrium strategy pro¯le. Finally, we show that
(SA;S¤




B) as the unique Nash equilibrium of the resource distribution game.
Using the best response properties of any pair of Nash equilibrium strategies (SA;SB),
the next lemma establishes that the range of SA and SB di®er by a constant equal to the
equilibrium quality premium P(T).
Lemma 4.1. Let (SA;SB) be a Nash equilibrium of the resource distribution game and
let T 2 [1=2;1) be the equilibrium quality di®erence. Then, the range of SA is the same
as the range of the function maxfSB ¡ P(T);0g:
Proof. Suppose that some interval (s;s) is in the range of SA but not in the range of
maxfSB ¡ P(T);0g. Consider the resource distribution schedule ~ SA de¯ned as
~ SA(r) =
(
s if SA(r) 2 (s;s);
SA(r) otherwise.
For any r; ~ r 2 [0;1], and any ~ T ¸ T, we have ~ SA(r) ¸ SB(~ r) ¡ P(~ T) whenever ~ SA(r) ¸
SB(~ r) ¡ P(~ T). This implies that TA(~ SA;SB) = T. Since by construction
Z 1
0
~ SA(r) dr <
Z 1
0
SA(r) dr = YA;
there exists some other resource distribution schedule ^ SA such that TA(^ SA;SB) > T and
hence SA is not a best response to SB. If some interval (s;s) is in the range of maxfSB ¡
P(T);0g but not in the range of SA, a similar argument shows that SB is not a best
response to SA. Q.E.D.
{ 21 {The above result, together with the characterization of the unique candidate equi-
librium quality di®erence T¤ and the unique candidate equilibrium resource distribution
schedule S¤
B of organization B, implies that in any Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium re-
source distribution schedule S¤






From the characterization of the minmax strategy of organization B, we know that S¤
B
is zero up to r¤. Thus even the lowest type agent in organization A in equilibrium will
have a higher type than the agent of rank r¤ in organization B, regardless of the resource
distribution schedule chosen by A. In terms of allocation functions, this means that the
equilibrium allocation function t¤ will have t¤(r) = 1 for all r · r¤. For r > r¤; the
equilibrium allocation function will depend on SA. If A wants to achieve an allocation
where its rank r0 agents are of type higher than agents of rank r in organization B then it
must o®er SA(r0) ¸ SB(r) ¡ P(T¤). Since S¤
B is linear for r ¸ r¤, the cost minimization
problem (3.1) for A, with T = T¤ and SB = S¤
B, admits multiple solutions. For example,





1 if r · r1;
(T¤ ¡ r1)=(r0 ¡ r1) if r1 < T ¤ < r0;
0 if r ¸ r0;
(4:1)
solves (3.1). Moreover, for any such allocation function t given by (4.1), St
A(r) is equal
to S¤
B(r1) ¡ P(T¤) for r < 1 ¡ (T¤ ¡ r1)=(r0 ¡ r1), and equal to S¤
B(r0) ¡ P(T¤) for




A(r) dr = C(T¤;S¤
B) = YA:
This implies that T¤ is a sorting equilibrium for (St
A;S¤
B), and St
A is a best response to
S¤
B, because by the de¯nition of S¤
B we have TA(SA;S¤
B) · T¤ for all resource distribution
schedules SA that satisfy the resource constraint.
The above strategy pro¯le (St
A;S¤
B), however, is not a Nash equilibrium. By construc-
tion, St
A only assumes two values in the interval [0;S¤
B(1)¡P(T¤)]; hence, by Lemma 4.1,
{ 22 {S¤
B is not a best response to St
A. It turns out that the space of A's best responses to S¤
B
is not limited to resource distribution schedules of the type described above. In fact, as
shown in the next lemma, any SA that exhausts the resource constraint and such that
SA(1) · S¤
B(1) ¡ P(T¤) is a best response to S¤
B.




0 SA(r) dr = YA: Then SA is a best response to S¤
B.
Proof. To prove the claim it is su±cient to show that T¤ is a sorting equilibrium given
(SA;S¤
B). By the de¯nition of t
T
¤
, for a sequence of discontinuity points (r0;r1;:::;rk)
such that S
¡1















B(r) ¡ P(T¤)) dr;
where r0 is the smallest rank in A that receives strictly positive resources and rk is the
largest rank that receive an amount of resources greater than S¤
B(1) ¡ P(T¤). After a
change of variable ~ r = S
¡1
A ((S¤














Using the assumption that SA exhausts the resource constraint and noting that
(1 ¡ rk)S
0¤
B + SA(1) = S¤
B(1) ¡ P(T¤);










B(1) ¡ P(T¤) ¡ YA):
Using the equation C(T¤;S¤
B) = YA, we can verify that the above expression is equal to
T¤. This establishes that T¤ is a ¯xed point of the mapping (2.3) and hence T¤ is a sorting
equilibrium for (SA;S¤
B). Q.E.D.
The proof of Lemma 4.2 relies crucially on the fact that S
0¤
B is constant. Recall that
organization A attempts to attract talents by choosing the cheapest ranks in B to raid.









The weaker organization B can prevent A from exploiting its vulnerable ranks by making
all ranks equally expensive to raid, hence the linear (beyond r¤) resource distribution
schedule S¤
B. Since all ranks are equally expensive to raid, organization A is indi®erent
between strategies that raid di®erent ranks above r¤ when B adopts its minmax strategy.
The requirement that SA(1) · S¤
B(1) ¡ P(T¤) just ensures that organization A is not
devoting unnecessary resources on the top ranks.
Now we are ready to establish that a Nash equilibrium exists in the resource distribu-
tion game. We have already anticipated that the proof of the next result is by construction.
In particular, with an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we can show
that S¤
B is a best response to a resource distribution schedule S¤
A which is 0 up to some
rank ^ r 2 [0;1] and has a constant slope equal to S¤
B(1) above ^ r, such that S¤
A(^ r) = 0 and
S¤
A(1)+P(T¤) = S¤
B(1). The proof that (S¤
A;S¤
B) is a Nash equilibrium is then completed
by verifying that S¤
A exhausts the resource budget YA. See Figure 6 for a graphical illus-
tration of the equilibrium schedules. Note that the origins of S¤
A and S¤
B are di®erent in
the diagram; the di®erence is precisely the quality premium P(T¤).
Proposition 4.3. Let ^ r = P(T¤)=S¤
B(1) and S¤




0 if r < ^ r;
(r ¡ ^ r)S¤
B(1) if r ¸ ^ r:
The strategy pro¯le (S¤
A;S¤
B) is a Nash equilibrium of the resource distribution game.
{ 24 {Proof. We ¯rst verify that
R 1
0 S¤










From equation (3.10) for the schedule S¤





1 ¡ r¤ ¡ P(T¤) =
YB
1 ¡ T¤:
Substituting this expression for S¤





(YB ¡ P(T¤)(1 ¡ T¤))2
2(1 ¡ T¤)YB
= E(T¤) = YA:
Having established that S¤
A respects the resource constraint, we note that Lemma 4.2
and the fact that S¤
B is the minmax strategy imply TA(S¤
A;S¤
B) = T¤. Thus, to prove that
S¤
B is a best response to S¤
A, it is su±cient to verify that, given S¤
A, for any SB 2 SB there
is a sorting equilibrium with T ¸ T¤. Given S¤














A (SB(r) ¡ P(T¤)) dr;
where r0 is the lowest rank in B that receives more resources than P(T¤): By de¯nition,
S
¤ ¡1





Using the above expression, the resource constraint
R 1













Thus, DA(T¤) ¸ T¤ and DA has at least one ¯xed point greater than T¤. Q.E.D.
As in Lemma 3.2, By using a linear resource distribution schedule for ranks that receive
positive resources, organization A makes every rank equally costly for B to raid. No change
to S¤
B can improve the equilibrium quality di®erence for B. Unlike the equilibrium resource
distribution schedule S¤
B, there is no discontinuity for S¤
A because A does not need to pay
{ 25 {a quality premium to be competitive. This also means that S¤






B) as the unique Nash equilibrium of the resource distribution game
we will argue that S¤
B is not a best response to any other resource distribution schedule
SA which is a best response to S¤
B. In proving this claim, by Lemma 4.1, we need only
consider resource distribution schedules SA's that are continuous and for which SA(0) = 0
and SA(1) = S¤
B(1)¡P(T¤): Unfortunately, we cannot restrict further the set of candidate
Nash equilibrium strategies for A, since by Lemma 4.2 all feasible resource distribution
schedules that respect these three properties are indeed best responses to S¤
B. It is di±cult
to characterize B's best responses to an arbitrary strategy SA. Instead, in the proof of the
next proposition we establish that S¤
B is not a best response to SA 6= S¤
A by showing that
an appropriately constructed \small" modi¯cation of S¤
B improves B's payo®. The proof
considers only SA's that are strictly increasing when positive, as it is straightforward to
show that this is necessary for S¤
B to be a best response.
Proposition 4.4. The strategy pro¯le (S¤
A;S¤
B) is the only Nash equilibrium of the re-
source distribution game.
Proof. Let SA be a resource distribution schedule which is strictly increasing when
positive, and which satis¯es SA(0) = 0, SA(1) = S¤
B(1) ¡ P(T¤), and
R 1
0 SA(r) dr = YA.
We claim that if SA(r)+P(T¤) < rS¤
B(1) for some r 2 (0;1), then S¤
B is not a best response
to SA. Note that this claim is su±cient for the statement of the proposition because,
by construction, S¤
A is the pointwise smallest positive function for which the opposite
inequality holds for all r, and because S¤
A exhausts the resource budget, a property that
all best responses to S¤
B satisfy.
Given SA, let SA be the pointwise largest linear function with the property that
SA(r) · SA(r) + P(T¤) for all r, and let ~ r = supfr 2 [0;1] : SA(r) = SA(r) + P(T¤)g.
We distinguish between two cases. In the ¯rst case, we have SA(~ r) > P(T¤). Let r0 =
{ 26 {S
¤¡1







B(r) if r 62 (r0 ¡ ²;r0 + ²);
S¤
B(r0) if r 2 (r0 ¡ ²;r0 + ²):
For all ² · r0¡r¤, S²
B respects the resource constraint. Note that for each T, the allocation
function t
T(r;SA;S²





























B(r) ¡ P(T)) dr:
At T = T¤; the ¯rst term on the right-hand-side of the above equation equals 2²~ r. To








with strict inequality for all r > r0: Hence,
DA(T;SA;S¤
B) ¡ DA(T;SA;S²























B(r0) + ¯(r ¡ r0)) dr
= 0;
where the second line follows from SA being linear with some positive slope K, and the
third from the fact that S¤
B has constant slope ¯ for r ¸ r¤. The last line then obtains
because SA(~ r) = S¤
B(r0).
The following properties of DA(¢;SA;S²
B) can also be established: (i) DA(¢;SA;S²
B)
converges uniformly to DA(¢;SA;S¤
B) as ² becomes small; and (ii) D0
A(¢;SA;S²
B) con-
verges uniformly to D0
A(¢;SA;S¤
B) as ² becomes small. Using property (ii), the fact that
{ 27 {D0
A(T¤;SA;S¤
B) < 1 and the continuity of D0
A(¢;SA;S¤
B), we can establish that for su±-
ciently small positive °, we have D0
A(T;SA;S²
B) · 1 for T 2 (T¤;T ¤ + °) and for all su±-
ciently small ². Hence DA(T;SA;S²
B) < T for all T 2 [T¤;T ¤ +°) and ² su±ciently small.
Property (i) and DA(T;SA;S¤
B) < T for all T 2 [T¤ +°;1] also imply DA(T;SA;S²
B) < T
for T in the same range. Hence TA(SA;S²
B) < T ¤ for ² su±ciently small and S¤
B is not a
best response to SA.
In the second case, we have SA(~ r) = P(T¤). Then, there exist r0 and r1, with
r0 < r1, such that SA(r0) = S¤
A(r0), SA(r1) = S¤
A(r1) and SA(r) > S¤
A(r) for all r 2
(r0;r1). An argument similar to the one for the ¯rst case can be used to show that
a resource distribution schedule S²
B which reduces the amount distributed to ranks just
above S
¤¡1
B (SA(r0) + P(T¤)) and increases the amount of resources to ranks just below
S
¤¡1
B (SA(r0) + P(T¤)) does better than S¤
B against SA. Q.E.D.
The main di±culty in the above result is that, to show that organization B can
improve the quality di®erence T¤ in its favor we must check two conditions. First, there
is a modi¯cation of S¤
B for which T¤ is no longer a sorting equilibrium. Second, the
modi¯ed resource distribution schedule does not generate a sorting equilibrium with a
quality di®erence strictly larger than T¤. This is why it is not enough to identify the




Comparative statics analysis for the unique Nash equilibrium in the resource distribution
game is straightforward. Consider, for example, a fall in the concern for the peer e®ect,
as represented by an increase in ®. Examining the budget function (3.8) shows that a rise
in ® reduces the quality premium P(T) and hence shifts up E(T). Since equilibrium T¤
is de¯ned by E(T¤) = YA, this means that equilibrium quality di®erence between the two
organizations falls as people put less weight on the peer e®ect.
The degree of disparity in resources within an organization can be summarized by
slope of the resource distribution schedule and by the critical rank below which members
{ 28 {receive no resources. We note from Figure 6 that S¤
A is generally °atter than S¤
B, and
the critical rank ^ r for A is lower than the critical rank r¤ for B. In other words, our
model suggests that the organization resources are less concentrated at the top ranks in
the dominant organization than in the weaker organization. Furthermore, since r(T) is
increasing in T and decreasing in ®, a rise in ® lowers r¤. For organization A, we have
^ r = P(T¤)=S¤
B(1) = P(T¤)(1 ¡ T¤)=YB. Using the budget function (3.8) to express the
condition E(T¤) = YA, we get
(1 ¡ ^ r)2 = 2(1 ¡ T¤)YA=YB: (5:1)
Hence a fall in T¤ also implies a fall in ^ r. In other words, a fall in the concern for the peer
e®ect causes both the dominant organization and the weaker organization to reduce the
disparity in resources between the higher and lower ranks.
The equilibrium schedules (S¤
A;S¤
B) implies the following pattern for the mixing of
types across the two organizations: (i) a measure r¤ of the types µ < r¤=2 are exclusively
in the weaker organization B; (ii) a measure ^ r of types µ 2 [r¤=2;(r¤+^ r)=2) are exclusively
in the dominant organization A; and (iii) the remaining types µ ¸ (r¤+^ r)=2 are present in
both organizations, with the dominant organization A getting a fraction (1¡^ r)=(2¡r¤¡^ r)
of these top talents. When the peer e®ect becomes less important, both r¤ and ^ r falls.
Since the advantage of the dominant organization derives from the higher quality of its
agents, a reduction in the importance of the peer e®ect increases the number of high types
who are present in both organizations. Moreover, using equation (5.1), one can show that
1 ¡ ^ r








Hence, (1¡^ r)=(1¡r¤) falls as T¤ falls. This means that when the peer e®ect becomes less
important, the dominant organization gets a smaller share of these top talents.
We can also derive comparative statics for an increase in the resource budget of the
dominant organization. Brie°y, an increase in YA raises T¤ because the budget function is
upward sloping at T¤. Organization B economizes on the larger quality premium P(T¤)
by raising the critical rank r¤ below which it devotes no resources. Since ^ r = P(T¤)(1 ¡
{ 29 {T¤)=YB, the e®ect of YA on ^ r is positive if and only if T¤ < 3=4. On one hand, the increase
in T¤ and r¤ induces A to devote more resources to the top ranks to stay competitive with
B. On the other hand, the increase in resource budget allows A to devote more resources
to the lower ranks as well. Thus the overall e®ect on ^ r is ambiguous. Note, however, that
the slope of the schedule S¤
A when positive is S¤
B(1) = YB=(1 ¡ T¤). An increase in YA
therefore always makes the schedule S¤
A steeper for ranks above ^ r.
An increase in YB has an opposite e®ect on the equilibrium quality di®erence T¤ as an
increase in YA. However, these two e®ects do not completely o®set one another. Suppose
the resource budgets of both organizations are raised by one unit. Holding T ¯xed, the
maximum cost that the weaker organization B can imposed on the dominant organization







B ¡ (P(T¤)(1 ¡ T¤))2
2(1 ¡ T¤)Y 2
B
=
YA(1 + ^ r)
YB(1 ¡ ^ r)
> 1:
Hence, organization A cannot a®ord the maintain the same quality di®erence even if its own
resources are raised by an equal amount. The result is that equilibrium quality di®erence
T¤ falls.10 The availability of greater resources to the two organizations induces these
organizations to compete for talents by appealing to their concern for the pecking order
e®ect. As a result, the relative importance of the peer e®ect diminishes. The e®ect of an
equal increase in budgets is therefore similar to that of an increase in ®.
So far, we have assumed that organizations A and B are identical except for the fact
that YA ¸ YB and we focus on the A-dominant sorting equilibrium. Other di®erences
between the two organizations can be introduced into the model by assuming that the
utility from joining organization A is
VA(µ) = ®SA(rA(µ)) + mA + u:
One can think of the parameter u as the natural advantages (such as locational attraction)
of A relative to B, assumed to be common to all types of agents. In this setting, the quality
premium is P(T) = (T + u ¡ 1=2)=®. An increase in u has the e®ect of shifting down the
10 The same conclusion holds if YA and YB are increased by the same proportion.
{ 30 {budget function E(T), thereby raising the equilibrium quality di®erence T¤. Organization
B responds to this by raising the critical rank r¤ below which its members receive no
resources. Organization A also raises its critical rank ^ r in equilibrium, because its natural
advantages already o®er a large rent to intermediate talents at its lower ranks. The result
of this is that there is more intense competition for top talents, with a greater disparity in
resource distribution within each organization.
6. Discussion
The equilibrium pattern of mixing and segregation di®ers from what we derived in a
benchmark two-organization model of Damiano, Li and Suen (2005). In the earlier paper,
we have the \overlapping interval" structure, where the very talented are captives in the
high quality organization and the least talented are left to the low quality organization,
while the intermediate talents are present in both. The focus of the earlier paper is on
comparative statics analysis with respect to factors that a®ect the tradeo® between the
peer e®ect and the pecking order e®ect, and on competitive equilibrium implementation
and welfare implications. To the extent that the tradeo® is a®ected by resource distribution
policies of organizations, these policies are exogenously ¯xed in that paper, rather than
chosen in a strategic game. In the present paper, we model the pecking order e®ect as
concern for allocation of organizational resources, and derive equilibrium sorting pattern by
solving the resource distribution game between the organizations. Thus, intermediate types
mix across organizations when the tradeo® between the peer e®ect and the pecking order
e®ect does not respond to organizational choices, while top talents attract organizational
competition when the tradeo® can be directly a®ected by organizational strategies.
In our model of organizational competition for talents, we have assumed that there is a
¯xed budget of resources for each organization. We view this as a reasonable approximation
of competition in the short term before production by the members generates any impact
on available resources. Another interpretation is that organizations we model are not-for-
pro¯t, so that the objective of the organization is not to maximize the pro¯t in terms
of the di®erence between total output and the resources expended to attract productive
members, but is instead to use the ¯xed resources to attract the best average quality.
{ 31 {Organizations in our model have a ¯xed capacity of half of the talent pool and must
¯ll all positions. In particular, an organization cannot try to improve its average talent by
rejecting low types even though the capacity is not ¯lled. We have made this assumption in
order to circumvent the issue of size e®ect, and focus on implications of sorting of talents.
Alternatively, we can justify the assumption of ¯xed capacity if the peer e®ect enters the
preferences of talents in the form of total output (measured by the sum of individual types)
as opposed to the average type, and the objective of the organization is to maximize the
total output. Since all agents contribute positively to the total output, in this alternative
model all positions will be ¯lled.
We have restricted organization strategies to meritocratic resource distribution sched-
ules. This is a natural assumption given how we model the sorting of talents after orga-
nizations choose their schedules. Non-meritocratic resource distribution schedules would
create incentives for talented agents to \dispose of" their talent. Another assumption we
have made about organization strategies is that resource distributions do not depend on
type directly. This is a reasonable assumption in the presence of the resource constraint;
a resource distribution schedule that depends directly on type might exceed the resources
available or leave some resources unused depending on the distribution of types that join
the organization. Moreover, at the equilibrium quality di®erence and against the equi-
librium resource distribution schedule of the rival organization, each organization cannot
improve its quality by deviating to a resource distribution schedule that depends on type
as well as on rank. This is because any sorting equilibrium after such a deviation can
be replicated by a deviating schedule that depends on type only. Our equilibrium is thus
robust to deviations allowed by a richer strategy space.
Our main results of linear resource distribution schedules rely on the assumption
of uniform type distribution. This assumption implies that the impact on the quality
di®erence of an exchange of one interval of types for another interval between the two
organizations depends only on the di®erence in the average types of the two intervals. This
property allows us to transform the minmax problem in resource distribution functions to
a linear programming problem in allocation functions. We leave the question of whether
the method we develop in this paper is applicable to more general type distributions to
future research.
{ 32 {Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1
We ¯rst prove that ~ t assumes a countable number of values, and then show that it assumes
at most one value strictly between 0 and 1.
To establish the ¯rst claim, let I denote the collection of all open intervals I ½ [0;1]
such that: (i) t is continuous and strictly decreasing on I; (ii) ¢0 is monotone on I; and
(iii) there is no open interval I0 ¾ I that satis¯es properties (i) and (ii). Since both t and
¢0 have a countable number of discontinuities, the set I is countable. Moreover, t assumes
a countable number of di®erent values on [0;1]nI. If t assumes uncountably many values,
then I is non-empty. For each I 2 I, let r¡ = infr I and r+ = supr I. Let r0 2 (r¡;r+)
solve




and let ^ r 2 (r¡;r+) solve




We construct a new allocation function ~ t such that, for each I 2 I, if ¢0 is decreasing
on I, then ~ t(r) = t(r0) for all r 2 I: Otherwise, if ¢0 is increasing on I, then ~ t(r) = t(r¡)
for all r 2 (r¡; ^ r] and ~ t(r) = t(r+) for all r 2 (^ r;r+): On [0;1] n I, ~ t is identical to t:
By construction ~ t is a decreasing function and
Z 1
0



















~ t(r) ¡ t(r)
¢
¢0(r) dr:












































(t(r¡) ¡ t(r))¢0(r) dr +
Z r+
^ r




(t(r+) ¡ t(r)) dr + ¢0(^ r)
Z r+
^ r
(t(r¡) ¡ t(r)) dr
= 0:
Therefore the ¯rst claim follows.
We can now restrict attention to allocation functions t which assume a countable
number of values. Suppose there are two consecutive intervals Ij and Ij+1, such that t
assumes value tj on Ij and value tj+1 on Ij+1, for some 1 > tj > tj+1 > 0. Consider a














¡ ) if r 2 Ij+1;
t(r) otherwise.
For ² small, ~ t² is a decreasing function. Moreover, by construction,
R 1














































A(r) dr is linear in ², we can always choose some ² for which ~ t
assumes one less value than t and does at least as well as t for the objective function of
(3.2). Q.E.D.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3.5
To establish the upper bound, note that from Lemma 3.2, we have C(T;S¤
B) = S¤
B(T) ¡
P(T). Using the formula (3.10) for the schedule S¤




(1 ¡ r¤)2 (Y ¡ P(T¤)(1 ¡ r¤)) + P(T¤) ¡ P(T):
{ 34 {Since C(T;S¤
B) is linear in T and C(T¤;S¤
B) = YA by the de¯nition of T¤, it is the case
that C(T;S¤
B) > YA for all T > T ¤ if and only if
2(YB ¡ P(T¤)(1 ¡ r¤))




Using the condition that C(T¤;S¤
B) = YA, the above inequality is equivalent to
®YA ¡ (T¤ ¡ r¤) > 0: (A:1)
To prove that condition (A.1) is true, we proceed in two steps. We ¯rst establish that
®YA ¡ (T¤ ¡ r¤) > 0 when YA = YB. Then we show that ®YA ¡ (T¤ ¡ r¤) is increasing in
YA, and hence condition (A.1) is true for all YA > YB.
For the ¯rst step, let T0 = maxfT 2 [1=2;1] : E(T) = YBg and let r0 = r(T0).
Condition (A.1) for the case YA = YB is equivalent to ®YB ¡ (T0 ¡ r0) > 0. For T0 > 1=2,
use the explicit formula of E(T) in equation (3.8) to obtain






Use this expression and the explicit formula for r(T) in equation (3.7) to obtain
T0 ¡ r0 = (1 ¡ T0)







It is straightforward to verify that ®YB > T 0 ¡ r0. For T0 = 1=2, it must be the case that
®YB > 1=2 and r0 = 0. Hence the condition ®YB > T 0 ¡ r0 also holds.
Next, we show that ®YA ¡ (T¤ ¡ r¤) > 0 whenever ®YB ¡ (T0 ¡ r0) > 0. To this end,
use equation (3.7) for r(T) to write
T¤ ¡ r¤ = (1 ¡ T¤)R(T¤);
where R(T) = (YB ¡ P(T)(1 ¡ T))=(YB + P(T)(1 ¡ T)). Also Use equation (3.8) for
E(T¤) = YA to get
®YA ¡ (T¤ ¡ r¤) = (1 ¡ T¤)R(T¤)
µ
2®YBR(T¤)
(1 ¡ r¤)2 ¡ 1
¶
:
{ 35 {There are two cases to consider. (i) Suppose R(T) is decreasing. In this case, (1 ¡
T¤)R(T¤) < (1¡T0)R(T0) since T¤ > T 0. Therefore, ®YA¡(T¤¡r¤) > ®YB¡(T0¡r0) > 0.
(ii) Suppose R(T) is increasing. In this case, R(T¤)=(1 ¡ r¤)2 > R(T0)=(1 ¡ r0)2 since
T¤ > T 0 and r¤ > r0. So ®YB ¡ (T0 ¡ r0) > 0 implies ®YA ¡ (T¤ ¡ r¤) > 0. Q.E.D.
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